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Fiscal policy and the duration of
financial crises
Roland Craigwell, Troy Lorde and Winston Moore*
Department of Economics, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus,
Bridgetown BB1100, Barbados
Financial systems across the world have all come under pressure due to the
on-going financial crisis. One of the most often asked questions during a
collapse is how long and how deep will the decline be as well as what policy
initiatives can be employed to shorten the recession. This study estimates a
model of the duration of financial crises in an attempt to identify whether
fiscal policy can reduce the time to recovery. The results suggest that fiscal
shocks, which could provoke an overreaction on the part of markets, tend
to lengthen crisis duration. Significant nonlinear effects of government
spending are also reported in relation to trade openness and financial
openness.
Keywords: financial crises; fiscal policy; duration models; financial system
JEL Classification: G01; E62; C41
I. Introduction
Rising delinquencies in the subprime mortgage
market in the United States triggered turbulences in
the subprime mortgage-backed securities market. The
latter disturbances then spread to other markets and
financial institutions, with further effects across
borders, and into other economies. Consequently,
the world is now experiencing an economic recession
with global activity declining since 2008 and likely to
continue to fall until around 2012. Both developed
and developing countries have been hard hit, and the
former economies are expected to register the
sharpest decreases in their post-war history. There
have been several suggestions to turn around global
growth. For instance, Spilimbergo et al. (2008)
argued for more concerted policy actions to stabilize
financial conditions as well as sustained strong policy
support to bolster demand. The Fed has responded to
this suggestion by modifying the terms on which
financial institutions can borrow from the Discount
Window and the creation of new liquidity enhancing
facilities like the Term Auction Facility, the Term
Securities Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer
Credit Facility (Mamun et al., 2010). Unfortunately,
there is very little empirical evidence on how long and
how deep the contraction in the world economy will
be as well as what specific policy initiatives can be
employed to shorten the recession.
This article estimates a model of the duration of
financial crises in an attempt to identify whether fiscal
policy can reduce the time to recovery. Several studies
have examined the severity of currency crises. For
instance, Bordo et al. (2000), Park and Lee (2001) and
Gupta et al. (2003) have investigated the magnitude
of deviation of output in the post-crisis years from
some pre-crisis trend, following a currency crisis.
However, the duration of recovery, that is, the time it
takes for the crisis-hit countries to return to nor-
malcy, and its determinants have only been assessed
by a few authors. Bordo et al. (2000) have compared
the recovery time from contractionary currency crises
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during the Gold Standard era with the post-Bretton
Woods period. Their work did not recognize the wide
variations in such durations both within and across
countries and failed to analyse properly their deter-
minants. Saubhik Deb (2005), however, provides a
more comprehensive examination of the importance
of economic fundamentals, international trade and
liberalized capital account policies in investigating the
speed of recovery from currency crises in both
developed and developing countries. The research
found that poor macroeconomic fundamentals and
capital account liberalization have no significant
impact on the duration of recovery, but all trade-
related variables were significant.
In essence, severities of currency crises have been
evaluated over and over again. Nevertheless, dura-
tions of recovery from such crises remain a mostly
neglected area. This article, like Saubhik Deb (2005),
aims to fill this void. It differs from Saubhik Deb
(2005) in the following ways: one, this article focuses
on financial crises rather than currency crises and
two, it uses a different set of determinants to explain
the duration of recovery. In particular, it concentrates
on the effect of fiscal policy to reduce the downturns
in these economies. Finally, the data are more
current, ending in 2007 rather than 1999 as in
Saubhik Deb (2005).
The rest of this article has been organized as
follows. Section II briefly discusses the empirical
model, the data and the econometric method. In
Section III, the results are presented and Section IV
concludes this article.
II. Empirical Approach
Econometric methodology
To model the duration of financial crises, this study
uses the Cox (1972) proportional hazard framework.
In this setup, the conditional hazard function, (tjx),
can be factored into separate functions of the
instantaneous probability of leaving a state condi-
tional on survival to time t and a vector of explan-
atory variables x with unknown coefficients  and 0.
Formally
ðtjxÞ ¼ 0ðt,Þðx,Þ ð1Þ
where 0() is the baseline hazard written as a function
of time only and () is a function of the explanatory
variables, which describes the way in which  shifts
due to differences in the independent variables and
therefore the time spent in noncrisis periods. It is
common to assume that ðx,Þ ¼ expðx0,Þ, as this
simplifies estimation and inferences. In this frame-
work, the coefficient  is the constant proportional
effect of a given explanatory variable on the condi-
tional probability of the spell ending.
As with most economic data, the observations on
financial crises are grouped into intervals, i.e. weeks,
months or years. When this is the case, the usual
approach is to form a panel and estimate either a
stacked logit or probit model of the probability of a
crisis occurring in each period, with a different
intercept for each period since in each time interval
the crisis either ends or does not (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005). The general formulation of the
discrete-time transition model is therefore
Pr ta  T5 tajT  ta1jx½ 
¼ F a þ x0ðta1Þð Þ, a ¼ 1, . . . ,A ð2Þ
where the choices of the function F are either the
standard normal Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) or the logistic CDF. The resulting likelihood
function is
Lð, 1, . . . , AÞ ¼
YN
i¼1
Yai1
s¼1
1 F s þ x0iðts1Þ
  " #
 F ai þ x0ðtai1Þ
  ð3Þ
Data and identification of crises
The study uses annual data from 1970 through 2007
for 55 developing and developed countries: Albania,
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Republic
of Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Finland, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri
Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and
Venezuela. The macroeconomic indicators include
private consumption as a per cent of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), investment as a per cent of GDP,
openness, exports, imports, current account as a per
cent of GDP, per capita growth, prices, terms of
trade, import reserve cover, domestic credit, liquid
liabilities, money, nonperforming loans and govern-
ment expenditure. These variables are taken from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World
Development Indicators (WDI) published by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
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Bank, respectively (see the Appendix for a description
of the variables used in the study).
The observations on financial crises were obtained
from two sources Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache
(2005) and Laeven and Valencia (2008). Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Detragiache identify a financial crisis to
have taken place if at least one of the following four
conditions is assumed to exist: (1) the ratio of
nonperforming assets to total assets in the banking
system rises above 10%; (2) the cost of the rescue
operation was at least 2% of GDP; (3) banking sector
problems led to large scale nationalization of banks
and (4) bank runs that required deposit freezes or
deposit guarantees by the government. Laeven and
Valencia (2008) have employed a similar approach.
However, the authors excluded events that were not
systemic in nature.
The database suggests that the largest number of
episodes of banking distress occurred in the late to
early 1990s. Figure 1 reports the distribution of
financial crises over time. Between 1988 and 1995,
about one-fifth of the countries included in the
sample were classified as having financial systems
that were in distress, peaking at 23 countries in 1994.
Since this period, however, the number of financial
crises across the globe has declined, particularly
during the 2000 to 2005 era.
Figure 2 shows that all of the countries in the
database experienced at least one financial crisis
throughout the sample period. Ghana had the largest
number of reported episodes of financial distress: 15
out of the 38 years under investigation. Following
Ghana, Ecuador, the Philippines and the United
States had the next highest number of periods of
financial crisis, that is, 14. Most of the other countries
registered between four and 10 episodes of financial
distress. Only Panama, Jordan, El Salvador and the
United Kingdom had at most two periods of
financial crises.
Figure 3 shows the histogram of financial crises
across the globe. An episode is defined as the period
between the start and end of the crisis. On average,
the duration of these crises was about 5 years: 13 out
of the 78 episodes of financial crisis lasted about 5
years, that is, about 17%. Most of the remaining
episodes took between 2 and 6 years.
Empirical model
The empirical model is based on the following general
definition given by the G-10 Working Party on
Financial Sector Consolidation (2001) which states
that a crisis is ‘an event that will trigger a loss in
economic value or confidence in a substantial portion
of the financial system that is serious enough
to . . .have significant adverse effects on the real
economy’. The onset of a banking crisis usually
tends to be associated with depositor runs that result
in the closure or takeover of several banks either by
other financial institutions or government. These
activities lead to further interventions elsewhere in the
financial sector to assist or takeover other financial
institutions.
Several factors underlie the imbalances that cause
countries to experience financial crises. Two key fiscal
policy variables are employed in this study: govern-
ment expenditure, proxied by real government con-
sumption and the so-called fiscal shock obtained
from the residuals of a regression of real government
spending on GDP. The fiscal shock variable is the
traditional policy recommendation made during
financial crises; it attempts to capture the additional
expenditure undertaken with a goal of addressing the
crisis in the financial system since not all government
spending undertaken during a crisis represent fiscal
injections. Hitherto, these hypotheses have not been
rigorously evaluated.
Control variables are also included in the empirical
model to capture those key indicators that have been
found in the literature to have an important impact
on the emergence of financial crises. Weak or
unstable macroeconomic fundamentals have been a
feature of many financial crises. Eichengreen et al.
(1995), who were among the first researchers to
examine the causes of financial crises, have found
(using a sample of 20 industrial countries) that factors
such as capital controls, past government deficits,
past and future inflation, future GDP and employ-
ment growth and past current account balances were
important determinants of currency crises (such as
failed speculative attacks, devaluation, revaluation).
Governments, it was argued, bring currency crises on
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Fig. 1. Banking crises around the globe
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themselves through reckless expansionary policies.
Alternatively, where governments do not act irre-
sponsibly, crises occur because markets may believe
that governments will shift to more expansionary
policies in the abandonment of their exchange rate
commitments. Park and Lee (2001), in fact, report
that the depreciation of the real exchange rate,
expansionary macroeconomic policies and favourable
global environments are critical for the speedy post-
crisis recovery. In order to control for the effects of
macroeconomic conditions, the study therefore
includes the detrended private consumption,
investment, exports, imports and prices in order to
capture the influences of large unexpected changes of
these variables on the financial system. Other domes-
tic macroeconomic factors incorporated in the model
are openness, the current account balance and per
capita GDP growth following Lartey and Farka
(2011).
Other types of factors that have played a role in
financial crises are external conditions, particularly
large abrupt changes in world interest rates or the
terms of trade (IMF, 1998). Frankel and Rose (1996)
test whether variables like ‘northern’ interest rates
and output and so-called external variables, such as
over-valuation, the current account and the level of
indebtedness and the composition of the debt, can
explain currency crashes. Their results suggest that
the latter tend to occur when foreign direct invest-
ment inflows dry up, when foreign reserves are low,
domestic credit growth is high, ‘northern’ interest
rates rise and when the real exchange rate is
overvalued; they also tend to be associated with
sharp recessions. Similar findings are reported by
Sachs et al. (1996). Following Frankel and Rose
(1996), the terms of trade, current account balance as
well as an index of global financial crises are included
in the empirical model to capture contagion effects.
Fig. 2. Number of periods of banking crises
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Fig. 3. Duration of banking crises
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Distortions in the financial sector coupled withmac-
roeconomic instability form another set of indicators
that can lead to financial crises. These distortions
frequently occur during periods when countries are
undergoing rapid financial liberalization and innova-
tion. Weak supervision and inadequate regulatory
regimes also contributed by creating environments,
which influenced financial institutions to take impru-
dent risks. Hutchison and McDill (1999) have found
that institutional characteristics such as financial
liberalization and explicit deposit insurance increase
the probability of banking crises. They noted in
particular that the coincidence of recent financial
liberalization and explicit deposit insurance together
appeared to play an especially important role in
creating conditions of moral hazard and increasing
the probability of a banking problem occurring. The
financial variables incorporated in the model used
here are domestic credit, liquid liabilities, the import
reserve cover, money and nonperforming loans.
III. Results
The basic duration model of financial crises (which
includes all explanatory indicators except the fiscal
policy variables) is estimated by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and maximum likelihood techniques
for comparison purposes. The goodness-of-fit
McFadden R2 statistic is 0.236 and the outcome of
the Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test was
14.112[0.079], suggesting that the actual and pre-
dicted periods of crisis are ‘small’. In addition, the
expectation prediction table indicates that the model
is 22.3 percentage points better at predicting
responses than the constant probability model.
Given that the estimated model provides a reasonable
representation of the duration of financial crises over
the sample period, the coefficient estimates are
evaluated to identify the main macroeconomic deter-
minants of the duration of crises.
The results of the baseline duration model given in
Table 1 imply that 10 out of the 16 macroeconomic
indicators identified are statistically significant deter-
minants of the duration of financial crises: private
consumption, investment, openness, exports, imports,
current account, growth, domestic credit and an
index of global financial crises. The imports of goods
and services, as well as the current account balance,
domestic credit and the global index of financial
crises were all positively associated with the duration
of financial crises. In contrast, private consumption,
investment and imports, as well as openness and per
capita GDP growth were negatively correlated with
the duration of financial crises. These results are
broadly consistent with much of the earlier literature
in the area (see, e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1995) that
stresses the importance of macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Per capita GDP growth had the largest absolute
influence on the duration of financial crises, with a
one percentage point rise in growth doubling the
probability of exiting a crisis state. Increases in
private consumption as well as investment also had
relatively large negative effects on the probability of
exiting a financial crisis. In contrast, balance of
payments disequilibria and the deviation of imports
from trend had the greatest positive impacts on the
duration of financial crises.
Table 1. Macroeconomic determinants of the duration of
financial crises
OLS
Maximum
likelihood
Private consumption
(per cent of GDP)a
0.239 0.328
(2.045) (2.610)*
Investment
(per cent of GDP)a
0.140 0.165
(3.538)*** (4.169)***
Openness 0.026 0.036
(1.648)* (2.312)**
Exportsa 0.072 0.140
(1.375) (2.564)**
Importsa 0.071 0.143
(1.242) (2.438)**
Current account
(per cent of GDP)
0.139 0.245
(1.814)* (2.666)***
Per capita growth 0.969 1.051
(6.076)*** (6.313)***
Pricesa 0.022 0.025
(0.640) (0.681)
Terms of tradea 0.013 0.042
(0.289) (0.866)
Import reserve cover 0.032 0.042
(1.640) (1.437)
Domestic credit 0.001 0.001
(2.496)** (2.309)**
Liquid liabilities 0.002 0.002
(1.641) (1.595)
Money 0.002 0.002
(1.560) (1.593)
Nonperforming loans 0.000 0.000
(2.428)** (1.399)
Index of global
financial crises
0.017 0.019
(15.091)*** (13.143)***
McFadden R2 0.197 0.234
SE of regression 0.354 0.351
Notes: z-statistics values are provided within parentheses
below the coefficients.
aDeviation from a linear trend value.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels
of testing, respectively.
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Impact of fiscal policy
Many governments have used fiscal policy in an
effort to shorten the duration and mitigate the effects
of financial crises. However, the utility of such an
approach is not a given. While a fiscal shock can have
significant positive influences on private consumption
and investment, it could also mitigate growth as
policy uncertainty can have negative effects on
aggregate investment and economic growth
(Aizenman and Marion, 1993; Lensink et al., 1999).
It appears then that for there to be positive outcomes
from fiscal policy, the government should have a
creditable reputation along the lines of Kydland and
Prescott (1977).
This section of the study therefore augments the
basic duration model estimated earlier with various
indicators of fiscal expenditure. Table 2 gives the
results. The baseline regression is offered for com-
parison purposes along with the regressions with
indicators of total government consumption (regres-
sion 1) and fiscal shock (regression 2). Including these
indicators of fiscal policy did not change the coeffi-
cients of the other explanatory variables appreciably;
therefore, only coefficients on the fiscal policy vari-
ables are analysed.
The results for regression 1 suggest that the overall
measure of government consumption has a statisti-
cally insignificant impact on financial crises. This
finding implies that the overall level of government
spending has relatively little or no impact on the
duration of financial crises. When the fiscal shock
variable is used, however, a different result is
obtained: fiscal injections seem to have a positive
and statistically significant influence on the duration
of financial crises.
Table 2. Fiscal policy and the duration of financial crises
Baseline (1) (2)
Private consumption (per cent of GDP)a 0.328 0.328 0.325
(2.610)* (2.604)*** (2.588)***
Investment (per cent of GDP)a 0.165 0.165 0.158
(4.169)*** (4.169)*** (3.969)***
Openness 0.036 0.036 0.006
(2.312)** (1.995)** (0.317)
Exportsa 0.140 0.140 0.141
(2.564)** (2.564)** (2.567)**
Importsa 0.143 0.143 0.109
(2.438)** (2.410)** (1.803)*
Current account (per cent of GDP) 0.245 0.245 0.211
(2.666)*** (2.540)** (2.283)**
Per capita growth 1.051 1.052 1.074
(6.313)*** (6.295)*** (6.387)***
Pricesa 0.025 0.025 0.010
(0.681) (0.679) (0.257)
Terms of tradea 0.042 0.042 0.042
(0.866) (0.865) (0.858)
Import reserve cover 0.042 0.041 0.040
(1.437) (1.436) (1.374)
Domestic credit 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.309)** (2.028)** (2.172)**
Liquid liabilities 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.595) (1.565) (1.411)
Money 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.593) (1.561) (1.437)*
Nonperforming loans 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.399) (1.398) (1.427)
Index of global financial crises 0.019 0.019 0.018
(13.143)*** (13.140)*** (12.783)***
Government consumption – 0.000 –
(0.007)
Fiscal shock – – 0.020
(2.441)**
McFadden R2 0.234 0.234 0.238
SE of regression 0.351 0.351 0.351
Note: Refer notes of Table 1.
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It is also possible that fiscal policy could have
nonlinear effects on the duration of financial crises.
To investigate this issue, the fiscal shock variable is
interacted with some macroeconomic indicators that
may have important impacts on the emergence and
duration of financial crises: trade openness, financial
openness (Dider et al., 2008) and the existence of a
deposit insurance scheme (Hutchison and McDill,
1999). Only the interaction terms are reported for
brevity, since the coefficients of the other variables
did not change appreciably.
In each regression, the levels component of the
variable is included along with the interaction term.
Column (3) of Table 3 provides the results from the
interaction between trade openness and the fiscal
shock. The interaction allows one to test whether
countries with more liberal trade policies are likely to
experience differential effects of government spend-
ing. The findings in the table indicate that nonlinear
influences are statistically significant when govern-
ment-spending changes are unanticipated; in fact,
unanticipated government-spending movements can
lead to longer financial crises. This result suggests
that in countries with higher levels of international
integration, unanticipated fiscal shocks can poten-
tially lengthen the duration of a financial crisis. This
could occur if markets believe that such policy shocks
are due to an unsustainable macroeconomic environ-
ment with high rates of interest and inflation as well
as balance of payments disequilibria.
Much of the literature also notes that many
financial crises have occurred after countries have
opened their capital and financial accounts
(Hutchison and McDill, 1999; Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999). As a result, Column (4) of Table 3
also provides the findings from inter-acting the fiscal
shock variable with the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of
financial openness. Similar to the results for trade
openness, the findings suggest that fiscal shocks tend
to have statistically significant effects on countries
with fewer restrictions on capital flows. Without
restrictions on capital flows, participants in the
market may overreact to movements in government
spending leading to larger capital outflows.
In countries where there are restrictions on capital
flows, the impacts of this overreaction may be
moderated, as investors cannot easily adjust their
holdings of foreign assets.
While deposit insurance systems provide a useful
safeguard for depositors in financial institutions, it
also creates conditions of moral hazard as financial
institutions may be more inclined to take excessive
risks with the funds deposited within their institution.
If this is the case, the existence of deposit insurance
schemes may prolong the duration of financial crisis
as these institutions are not fully penalized for their
activities. The results provided in Table 3 to some
extent lends credence to this assertion as the interac-
tion between fiscal shock and the existence of a
deposit insurance scheme was positive but statistically
insignificant. Therefore, the existence of deposit
insurance systems does not seem to influence the
effectiveness of fiscal interventions.
IV. Conclusions
The 2007–2009 financial crisis in the US has led
commentators to ask questions about how long and
how deep the decline in real output will be as well as
what policy initiatives can be employed to shorten the
recession. This study estimates a model of the
duration of financial crises in an attempt to identify
whether fiscal policy can reduce the time to recovery.
The results suggest that the overall measure of
government consumption has a statistically insignif-
icant impact on financial crises, implying that the
level of government spending has no statistically
significant effect in relation to shortening the dura-
tion of the crisis. However, when a fiscal shock
indicator is used a different finding is obtained. The
additional fiscal shock seems to lengthen the duration
of financial crises. As noted by Kaminsky et al.
(2003), maybe unanticipated fiscal shocks do not
allow investors the opportunity to reduce their
portfolios in an orderly fashion.
This article also investigates the nonlinear effects of
fiscal policy on the duration of financial crises by
interacting the fiscal shock variable with trade
openness, financial openness and the existence of a
deposit insurance scheme. The results for trade and
financial openness variables indicate that nonlinear
effects are statistically significant when interacted
with the fiscal shock term. This finding suggests that
in countries with higher levels of international
Table 3. Nonlinear effects of fiscal policy on the duration of
financial crises
(3) (4) (5)
Unanticipated
trade open
0.021 – –
(2.175)**
Unanticipated
financial open
– 0.008 –
(1.965)**
Unanticipated
deposit insurance
– – 0.016
(1.185)
Notes: z-Statistics values are provided within parentheses
below the coefficients.
**Indicates significance at the 5% level of testing.
Fiscal policy and the duration of financial crises 799
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ola
nd
 C
rai
gw
ell
] a
t 2
1:2
2 1
7 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
integration unanticipated shocks can potentially
lengthen the duration of a financial crisis. This
could occur if markets believe that such policy
shocks could result in an unsustainable macroeco-
nomic environment with high rates of interest and
inflation as well as balance of payments disequilibria.
Similar to the findings for trade openness, the
results for financial openness imply that unantici-
pated changes in government spending tend to have
statistically significant effects in countries with fewer
restrictions on capital flows. Without restrictions on
capital flows, the participants in the markets may
overreact to unanticipated movements in government
spending leading to larger capital outflows. In
countries where there are restrictions on capital
flows, the impacts of this overreaction may be
moderated, as investors cannot easily adjust their
holdings of foreign assets.
The results provided in this study therefore seem to
suggest that fiscal shocks do not reduce the duration
of financial crises. Since most shocks result from a
crisis of confidence, a more credible policy response
seems to be able to demonstrate to the public the
sustainability of government finances. This assures
market participants that further stress on the finan-
cial system would not result from future government
default or tax increases.
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Appendix
Variable Description
Private consumptiona Detrended real private consumption as a per cent of GDP
Investmenta Detrended real private investment as a per cent of GDP
Opennessa Real exports of goods and servicesþ imports of goods and services as a per cent of GDP
Exportsa Detrended real exports of goods and services as a percent of GDP
Importsa Detrended real imports of goods and services as a per cent of GDP
Current accounta Real exports of goods and services – real imports of goods and services
Per capita growtha Annual growth in real per capita GDP
Pricesa Detrended GDP deflator index
Terms of tradea Detrended ratio export to import prices
Import reserve coverb Total reserves minus gold as a ratio to the previous year’s imports
Domestic creditc Domestic credit to the private sector as a per cent of GDP
Liquid liabilitiesc Liquid liabilities as a per cent of GDP
Moneyc Money and quasi-money as a per cent of GDP
Nonperforming loansc Nonperforming loans as a ratio of total loans
Index of global financial crisesd Number of financial crises around the globe in the current year
Sources: aUnited Nation’s National Accounts Database; bIMF’s IFS Database; cWorld Bank’s WDI Database; dDemirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2005).
Fiscal policy and the duration of financial crises 801
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ola
nd
 C
rai
gw
ell
] a
t 2
1:2
2 1
7 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
